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Abstract. Currently, there is an increasing tendency to migrate the management 
of communications and information systems onto the Web. This is making 
many traditional service support models obsolete. In addition, current security 
mechanisms are not sufficiently robust to protect each management system 
and/or subsystem from web-based intrusions, malware, and hacking attacks. 
This paper presents research challenges in autonomic management to provide 
self-protection mechanisms and tools by using trust and reputation concepts 
based on policy-based management to decentralize management decisions. This 
work also uses user-based reputation mechanisms to help enforce trust man-
agement in pervasive and communications services. The scope of this research 
is founded in social models, where the application of trust and reputation ap-
plied in communication systems helps detect potential users as well as hackers 
attempting to corrupt management operations and services. These so-called 
“cheating services” act as “attacks”, altering the performance and the security in 
communication systems by consumption of computing or network resources 
unnecessarily.  
Keywords: Trust Management, Pervasive Services, Policy-Based Management, 
Autonomic Communications, Pervasive Computing, Reputation Mechanisms, 
Systems Management, Social Networks, Information Systems. 
1   Introduction 
Social relationships are built based on the trust between people. Computing and 
communications systems are now aiming to take advantage of such models and then 
use the concepts of reputation and trust to, for example, generate systems offering 
trustworthy and secure information services and networking applications. Such sys-
tems, as trust generators, can also be used to support diverse applications in other 
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systems or sub-systems requiring certain security levels. In computing, trust manage-
ment arise from the necessity to remotely execute operations, and has been adopted as 
a way to enable security for distributed systems in situations where risk taking man-
agement decisions exists. Hence, trust management systems must offer certain guar-
antees to securing information, as well as processes that create, manage distribute, and 
govern information and services, in a reliable and efficient manner.   
Trust management [1] is based on a philosophy of decentralizing security deci-
sions, and as consequence of this, the creation of open and decentralized systems and 
stable and secure services [2] are promoted. In current service management systems 
and Future Internet solutions is crucial to protect the system and its sub-systems. 
Actually, there are several initiatives focused on specifying how to build open, dis-
tributed and secure management systems. The NGOSS, or New Generation Opera-
tions Systems and Software from the Tele-Management Forum (TMF) [3], attempts to 
standardize the processes and data used by Business and Operations Support Systems 
(BSSs and OSSs) for example. However, even ambitious initiatives such as this have 
failed to produce information models that are able to provide trust management and 
reputation services. Without a standard definition of such concepts, vendors will build 
their own device- and application-specific data models that will redefine common 
concepts. As information and management of communications systems migrating 
onto the web, the adoption of trust management practices is crucial to protect infor-
mation and processes that have an inherent risk associated with it.  
The use of a services-oriented philosophy helps this problem, and enables service 
support models to evolve and meet the needs of new applications that incorporate new 
technologies. The DEN-ng information model [4][5][6] was built using many differ-
ent abstractions following this philosophy, and forms the basis for the work presented 
in this paper. However, the development of a robust information-centric view is only 
one part of the solution. The evolution of current security mechanisms in systems is 
not sufficiently effective to protect each management system and/or subsystem from 
intrusions or hacking attacks, especially if web-based operation is desired. This re-
quires dedicated trust management protocols, formats, applications, and tools. In 
addition, trust management plays, more than ever, an important role in the design of 
any system and the interfaces with the user(s).  
Communications and Internet systems have not yet sufficiently addressed the im-
portance of the social needs that users and the adaptation of their social models have 
in computing systems, however some initiatives following this translation between 
domains exist. A clear example of such translation of models can be found in bio-
inspired systems, where biological reactions from the human body or animals are 
studied and implemented as computing mechanisms emulating such behavior [7]. 
Another example is the operation of social networks, where features and human be-
haviors are implemented in communications networks and systems. So, the awareness 
of such social models and the necessity of using them to provide an immersive envi-
ronment generating trust in computing systems is required. 
The capture of such models and its adequate translation and implementation into 
computing environments has acquired more attention in the trust management  
community. Trust management is broadly accepted as required for modeling,  
analyzing, and managing decisions within certain trust levels [8][9]. This paper pre-
sents an approach, rooted in the management of pervasive systems, where autonomic 
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management is shown to be a promising approach to implementing self-protection. 
Figure 1 depicts our vision about typical web service security in the left-hand side of 
the picture supporting management communications. Our approach specifically exam-
ines how to support services and network security in pervasive services and the Future 
Internet. This trust management approach concentrates on management services and 
applications using an autonomic orientation.  
 
Fig. 1. Management of Services to Enable Trust in Future Internet using Autonomic Technologies 
This paper discusses a methodology that can be used in the framework of trust 
management to create solutions using reputation mechanisms based on policies. This 
approach can then apply this knowledge to support dynamic management of pervasive 
services. The reputation mechanism proposed follows social networks and other user-
based reputation management systems principles [10][11]. The shortcomings of such 
systems, in terms of multi-criteria analysis and evaluation as well as implementation 
and realization experiences, are addressed in this paper, with the objective to illustrate 
how this research activity can develop new solutions that satisfy the important real 
world requirements of using multi-criteria for computing appropriate levels of reputa-
tion and trust using policy-based management mechanisms. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related work for 
offering efficient and secure service deployment using trust management operations. 
Section 3 briefly describes the interaction between users and systems, and then  
introduces trust management based on reputation models that describe its conceptual 
relationship with the policy-based management paradigm. Section 4 introduces our 
policy-based trust model in services support as well as in pervasive management 
operations. Section 5 introduces a scenario in which policies and the trust and reputa-
tion model proposed are used for validation purposes. Finally, section 6 summarizes 
the contributions and conclusions of this paper. 
2   Related Work 
Participative user design [12] has been strongly influenced by ubiquitous computing, 
which is in turn motivated by developing systems with the ability to incorporate sur-
rounding information about users and the environment, and to use such information to 
perform operations as described in [13][14][15]. However, these efforts do not usually 
include the use of trust management concepts. 
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There are a significant number of approaches that use social models for defining 
secure interactions between users and computational systems [16][17]. Recently, in 
the field of management services, user behavior has been described and introduced for 
taking control of specific management operations in networks and the systems [18]. 
Other approaches explore the translation of human behavior using social models, 
which enables systems to control services in a more secure and transparent manner 
[19]. An example is the NetTrust project [20] that uses a value-sensitive design 
mechanism to validate trust levels, particularly for e-commerce applications.   
This approach can be applied to many other systems, such as [21] and [22]. Our re-
search extends these approaches and concentrates on the task of supporting trust and 
reliable management service operations. Trust management is crucial in the deploy-
ment of pervasive secure services and their dynamic management nature allows dele-
gating decision-making. Trust management helps to generate reliable management 
systems supported by self-protection and autonomic mechanisms.  
Approaches for managing trust can be categorized in two major fields, as classified 
in [23]. However, when related to the field of autonomic communications, both major 
fields are in some way complementary each other. Today, with most of the services 
tendency towards a service-based design, the development of trust management  
follows a more integrated perspective for managing trust, and focuses on providing 
security and reliability about and for an entity. The use of policies to address this 
challenge in trust management is relevant; however, policies traditionally manage the 
decisions of a system for controlling specific set of operations that are pre-defined or 
pre-programmed. Policies can assist in making decisions when a certain level of am-
biguity in the decision-making mechanism is present by utilizing the results of trust 
management systems. 
Policies, as a tool for managing networks and services, have promoted a number of 
approaches for controlling such operations [24]. The main policy models used in 
network management are: 1) the IETF policy model [25][26], 2) the DMTF CIM [27], 
3) the TMF SID [28], and 4) the DEN-ng in ACF [6]. We use the DEN-ng model 
because of the reasons documented in [6]. Conceptually, the semantics of a DEN-ng 
policy rule are: WHEN a set of events triggers the evaluation of a set of conditions, IF 
those conditions evaluate to TRUE, THEN execute a set of actions. Optionally, a set 
of alternative actions can be executed if the evaluation of the condition is FALSE. 
Our research uses policies as the mechanism to produce dynamic control and changes 
in management, orchestration of services, and performance of systems [5][6][29]. 
3   Trust and Reputation Model 
Our current research is based on extending our policy representation to enable it to be 
used in trust management scenarios. This novel research task relates two different 
application fields – context awareness and trust management - by using contextual 
information from social models to determine reputation and trust values that can then 
guide the deployment of service offerings.  
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In pseudo-code, these mapping relationships are as follow: 
 
The Social Model      …(1) 
WHEN an User is requesting a service, 
IF an Evaluator evaluates User can be TRUSTED, 
THEN allows to Execute activities, 
        ELSE apply Restrictive actions. 
The Trust Policy-Based Model      …(2) 
WHEN an event_clause from a User is received, 
(which is able to trigger a condition_clause evaluation) 
IF a condition_clause evaluates to TRUE, 
(subject to the evaluation strategy) 
THEN execute one or more actions, 
(subject to the rule execution strategy) 
       ELSE execute alternative one or more actions, 
       (subject to the rule execution strategy) 
An event_clause specifies the event or set of events that trigger the evaluation of 
the condition_clause of the policy rule. A condition_clause evaluates the condition or 
set of conditions in order to determine which, if any, of the set of actions should be 
executed in response to the triggering event(s). An action_clause specifies the set of 
actions to be executed if the result of the condition_clause evaluates to TRUE (op-
tionally, a second action_clause can be defined to specify the set of actions to be 
executed if the condition_clause evaluates to FALSE). In our policy model, the con-
cept of restrictions arising from a lack of trust is also represented as actions. 
Previous work has modeled an enhanced version of role-based access control using 
the DEN-ng policy model [30]. This work enables us to extend the DEN-ng policy 
model to include trust management concepts. Another important feature of our previ-
ous work is the concept of the Policy Continuum [4][31]. This is an abstraction that 
enables different concepts and terminology to be used to define policies for different 
constituencies (e.g., business users, architects, and programmers), and relates these 
policies through a set of transformations. This is an important tool to represent multi-
criteria decisions and different levels of trust, in which different criteria and trust 
concepts for different constituencies can be related to each other.  
The users of future communication systems should be able to interact with systems 
more freely, and should be able to configure their own services according to personal 
preferences and needs. This has the unfortunate side effect of encouraging a larger 
number of malicious users to try to cheat or possibly disable the system. For these and 
other reasons, it is important to create mechanisms that help detect such attacks and 
differentiate between trusted and malicious users. To do so, we propose to use poli-
cies that incorporate trust and reputation mechanisms.  
Reputation mechanisms can be considered to be a subset of trust management sys-
tems that assign a computable measure of trust to any entity on the basis of the past 
history of that entity. The existing approaches in reputation-based trust management 
systems are not very different from that of social scientists. For example, [32] ob-
served that participants in a trust relationship thought of trust as follows: “We wish to 
know the sort of person we are dealing with before we deal with him. But we will 
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know it only imperfectly”. For this reason, [33] concluded: “Prior to the Internet, such 
questions were answered, in part, through personal and corporate reputations.  
Vendors provided references, Better Business Bureaus tallied complaints, and past 
personal experience and person-to-person gossip told you on whom you could rely 
and on whom you could not.” The point made by [34] is that questions and concerns 
related to the trustworthiness and reliability of users and other entities over the Inter-
net seems to be more challenging than in off-line relationships. The issue is therefore 
how to know the past behavior of an entity, how to compute and incorporate that 
behavior into calculations to define current trust levels, and then decide which rules to 
use to determine whether to trust or not such an entity. 
The trust model is based on certain levels of reputation and, as it happens in real 
life, people trust in other people. However, there are questions that arise, including 
(1) what kind of reputation levels are necessary to evaluate the trustworthiness of a 
user, (2) what criteria must be considered when a trust value of the reputation of the 
users is assigned, and (3) what happens if trust depends on a combination of several 
criteria. 
The mechanisms based on reputation and trust, for example, have been broadly 
used in many and diverse on-line sales and auction models, such as eBay, Amazon 
and Expansys. In this context, when a buyer wants to purchase a product, the buyer 
must make a decision based on the description and reputation of the seller. Most of 
the time, this is defined as a percentage, being the trust level average assigned by 
other buyers about the sellers. However, what happens if the seller is new to the 
market and does not have an established reputation? How can a buyer determine if 
sellers are cheating buyers by evaluating themselves positively? Hence, the final 
decision in trust is delegated to the buyers, mainly because there are not efficient 
mechanisms implemented that, based on trust or reputation can help the users 
and/or the systems to make such decisions. We use policies to control service op-
erations and activities based on statistical variations that indicate untrusted opera-
tions in the system and then apply actions as restrictions. We evaluate the individual 
reputation values and the combined values (reputation values with statistical varia-
tions) to provide a more accurate trust value; this is used by policy-based trust man-
agement mechanisms to offer more reliable decisions to the systems based on the 
revised reputation values. 
Multi-criteria is an important issue in trust management. We address this issue by 
using policy-based management. Figure 2 represents multi-criteria being used to  
 
 
Fig. 2. Policy-Based Approach for Solving Multi-Criteria Problems 
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define the trust level being assigned to users. An evaluator uses reputation and statis-
tical variations to evaluate and control if the user is trusted or not. If the user is deter-
mined to be trusted, then that user is allowed to execute authorized function(s). 
The functional component acting as an evaluator in Figure 2 has the capability to 
analyze and provide actions as a result of this analysis. For example, when manage-
ment applications must perform network changes, policy rules can take into account 
static as well as dynamic end user criteria and activities. Examples of criteria are user 
identity and electronic keys, while examples of activity are the statistical results such 
as visiting specific sites (e.g., eBay or Amazon) or contracts with services (e.g., phone 
and broadband services). Thus, users will be able to modify and execute system’s 
actions according reputation performance, which is enforced using policies. 
3.1   Premises in Trust Management 
Typical approaches for security in the systems are based on passwords or key codes, 
and these techniques work well on closed systems. However, when decentralized 
security systems are used, public key infrastructure (PKI) mechanisms [35] emerge as 
more suitable solutions that provide decentralized and more secure models. Cryptog-
raphy and digital certificates [36] are now used in many security solutions. Digital 
certificates ensure with an increased level of security, the transfer of information. The 
challenge is to decide who can access what type of information. 
Sociological research [37] views trust as a relationship between individuals (for 
example between persons) or collective (for example Nation States) social actors. 
Trust relationships enable social actors to take decisions that have some amount of 
risk, in a situation in which there is a lack of knowledge and the possibility to make 
an informed choice is precluded. This means that if we look at the pseudo code de-
scribing the social model in Section 2 above, in real social situations, the roles of User 
and Evaluator are filled by appropriate social actors (i.e., by persons). In sociological 
literature, these roles are called the Trustor (the entity who places trust, the Evaluator) 
and the Trustee (the actor which receives trust, the User). When trust is placed in the 
Trustee, the Trustor is able to solve uncertain situations by choosing one of several 
alternatives, each based on trust and reputation. An example is when a user (Trustor) 
wants to use an on-line banking system (Trustee). How can the user be sure that the 
online banking system, which represents a bank, is a reliable banking system? The 
user cannot know this beforehand, because the user cannot prove that what he or she 
thinks is a banking system is not instead a forgery. Here is when a trust relationship 
must be established.  
In this case, the recommendation of other people, based on previous experiences, 
and/or other evidence, can be used to establish a trust relationship. This can then be 
tested by, for example, conducting a small banking transaction and using the online 
system and then verifying the correctness of that transaction by physically visiting the 
bank. In other words, a trust relationship involves risk as well as uncertainty. 
The same model applied to Trust Management in autonomic computing solutions 
needs to take in account that the Evaluator (or Trustor) in a trust relationship is a 
Trusted System (i.e., a machine making decisions of behalf of human beings and 
controlling their actions). Therefore, in Trust Management, the decisions of users to 
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trust systems are delegated to the Trusted System [38]. Along this line of reasoning, it 
is important to recognize that the enacted evaluation strategy satisfying the IF condi-
tion is never a neutral one. 
Security policies and the mechanisms enforcing them might, for example, deter-
mine that there are unnecessary divisions of labor or unwanted social discriminations 
(e.g., gender, racial or age discriminations) in relation to how information is accessed. 
For these and other reasons, systems must be assisted in making decisions for deter-
mining the trustworthiness of users as well as in detecting cheating users. In addition, 
these systems must also be evaluated in their actions. The systems must take appro-
priate actions, such as restricting operations and/or blocking some or all user activities 
that could be performed. The service management tasks can then offer more dynamic 
performance and more efficient operation.  
3.2   Methodology and Formal Approach 
In this section, we describe the general concepts of the trust and reputation mecha-
nism that uses policies to evaluate and define user capabilities to create, use and de-
ploy web-based and Internet services. The reason to use policies is founded in the 
benefits that policies provide when they are used to control pervasive services [4][39]. 
We implement secure policies using an autonomic solution approach.  
We start from the premise that a user can create, configure and personalize services 
according to personal requirements and/or needs. For example, Joe wants a broadband 
service for downloading video on demand on weekends, but a simpler and more cost-
effective data service for checking email on weekdays. Key identifiers are created 
when the service is deployed and are associated (one to him and one to the service). 
The lowest rate of reputation is assigned to Joe, since he is the creator of the service. 
However Joe can be a user of other services; this is an activity that can be monitored 
and studied by systems to adjust Joe’s reputation level. Thus, Joe’s reputation in-
creases when he uses other services in a reliable manner. This is an automatic way to 
adjust the reputation value of Joe. However, it does not adjust the trust level of Joe’s 
service – this requires other people to be able to use that service reliably. In fact, it 
may be that to compute a trust level for Joe’s service, multiple criteria must be con-
sidered, studied and evaluated.  
To increase the trust level, multiple criteria must be considered, studied and evalu-
ated. For example, if Joe provides personal information, or if Joe uses a key identifier 
already assigned from a trusted source, then those criteria can be used to provide 
statistics for defining a trust level for Joe. Hence: 
    Criteria  Cn,m + Activity An,m Æ Functions  Fn,m   …(3) 
A formal way to capture and study the criteria and activity is to relate them in a 
matrix, with elements as rows and columns containing first order logic values to cate-
gorize and classify the user(s). In other words, if the element in the matrix exists, the 
value assigned will be 1; if the element in the matrix is not accessible, then the value 
assigned will be 0. In this way, the matrix is composed as Figure 3 shows. 
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Fig. 3. Trust Matrix for Criteria and Activity Allocation 
The user extensibility is represented by a single row matrix. Figure 4 shows this 
formalism, in which this single row matrix is made up of single elements that operate 
as a scalar product with the user matrix. This provides a scalable representation of our 
approach. 
 
Fig. 4. User Matrix in a Single Row 
The values of the criteria correspond to the number of users. Figure 5 shows the 
matrix representation. 
 
Fig. 5. User  Matrix for Multiple Users 
We assume that multiplication of two matrices is well-defined only if the number 
of columns of the left matrix is the same as the number of rows of the right matrix. 
The number of criteria must correspond to the number of users; this restriction is 
strictly followed to get the identity matrix. Thus, when the diagonal contains the value 
“1” in all of its elements, a user is evaluated as a trusted user to operate services and 
applications.  
Figure 6 shows the trust function as a matrix representation for multiple user crite-
ria. In other words, the matrix representation helps to identify possible cases when it 
is necessary to evaluate multiple-criteria cases. Furthermore, this evaluation is made 
in combination with the user’s activity represented as statistical values.  
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Fig. 6. Trust Function as a Result of User Matrix for Multiple Criteria 
In addition to the matrix representation and computation, we have defined statisti-
cal variations as the frequency of users visiting and/or using any type of service(s), 
such as eBay or Amazon. A more specific networking scenario is when traffic engi-
neering paths are being used as part of a communication service for a specific user. 
This classification will help to define the trust level of the user. 
The normal function to depict the statistical nature of our trust model approach can 
be represented by a Gaussian curve, as shown in Figure 7, where the values assigned 
to the user, as a result of reputation levels, are a function of higher positive reputation 
marking the limits of trustworthiness of the user for each specific service represented. 
Hence, if the user with a certain trustworthiness value wants to create and/or use a 
service, the system will allow him to do so only if the trustworthiness level is in the 
limits required by the service; otherwise, the request is rejected and logged. The red 
line indicates the minimum reputation level (it can be pre-defined according specific 
applications). A more detailed description of this scenario representation is presented 
in following sections. 
 
Fig. 7. Region of Service Allocation and Reputation Level 
If the service suffers a disruption or decrease in reputation, commonly cause by 
hacking or other malicious activities, then the conditions must be re-evaluated to 
define appropriate actions in the system, such as rejecting the creation of new ser-
vices, or to not allow any changes to a service after it has been created. 
The evaluations are based on the information from the system as well as from exter-
nal sources, such as sensor or pervasive applications capturing related information asso-
ciated with the user and the service. Two different values exist in this model, reputation 
and service allocation. When these values are combined, they represent trust values as 
complementary functions for the user’s activity. Figure 8 shows four regions. Policies 
play the role of evaluating such regions and based on certain pre-defined statistics de-
scribing the semantics of the four regions, take actions accordingly. 
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Fig. 8. Regions Related to Policy Service Allocation and User’s Reputation 
Region I is the most secure region, where the users are trusted all the time. Region 
IV has users that lack high reputation values, but these users can be considered reli-
able as they do not attempt to create services and their reputation value is medium. 
Region II is where the users have created many services, but do not themselves use 
those services; consequently, these users are trusted but do not have high reputation 
levels. Region III is where hackers and other malicious users are located; these users 
have many services they created and therefore, the reputation of each user is low. 
The methodology used to create the trust and reputation policy-based model, which 
can be applied to trust the management of service applications, is to define the trust 
model representation and the concepts involved according to standard sociological 
models. Sociological criteria are used to define relationships between the information 
in the service model described as policies, and the information contained in service 
management policies.  
The formal representation of social models are expressed in policy-based form and 
integrated as classes into the object-oriented policy-based management system. The 
policy model function defining the number of pervasive management operations in 
reference with the number of policies is shown in (4), details are described in [5], we 
associate the management operations with the activity of the user, thus in this way are 
generated the values used for statistic operations. 
∑+
=
pnps
Xs 1
F[{(Ctn)m}{(Xsn)m}]1(ps+pn) Æ Service Operations        …(4) 
where ps = number for initial service policies,  
           pn = number of total service policies, and  
  Xs = service function; Ct = content function for values of n > 1 and m > 1 
The advantage of combining policy-based management and reputation approaches 
is the possibility to define values based on the statistical variations in the reputation 
level and use those values in policies that define the trust level of the user. Figure 9 
depicts an example where the number of sub-regions is more specific as a conse-
quence of many users generating services. The policies here assist in evaluating re-
gions and sub-regions according to the same criteria already defined for each of the 
four main regions above. The number of policies follows the function used in (4) to 
calculate service operations and define the user activity according to the set of ser-
vices that the user is using.  
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The probability is calculated based on specific sub-regions of the four main regions 
already defined, according to the policy model function in [5], and includes the policy 
model to construct the trust model for services support.   
 
Fig. 9. Sub-regions Related to Policy Service Allocation Number 
The policies also assist in supporting decisions based on multiple criteria. Put an-
other way, policies are used to evaluate a diversity of opinions from different users 
about the same service. The multiple criteria evaluation is done according to personal 
experiences when using the service provides a level of reputation. 
4   Policy-Based Trust Management Model 
We support the idea that using social trust models for systems in which users commu-
nicate and make decisions having an inherent risk will enhance the security of such 
systems. A social model of trust needs to be used in order to provide a robust informa-
tion model that is able to represent user information in a formal manner. Once this is 
done, this model can then be used in autonomic systems. 
Figure 10 illustrates the challenge and the scope of applying trust management 
multi criteria results. From sociology, we have a social model of trust based on repu-
tation, whereas from technology, we have the ability to create new services. When 
these two studies are combined a more powerful services composition to trustworthy 
users can be assigned. The definition of the trust model based on reputation to be used 
by policy-based systems can make use of the information to generate new services. 
Therefore, applying such a trust model requires different assignments of metadata to 
describe trusted users as well as malicious users. 
 
Fig. 10. Policy-Based Model and Trust Concepts Relationships 
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4.1   Policy-Based Descriptions 
The user’s information should be used to generate personalized services that reside in 
the service management system but are enabled by the service operators. Both service 
creators as well as operators should be able to determine if the services are perform-
ing properly according to both the service model definition as well as with the pro-
posed trust model.  In this study the use of the DEN-ng policy information model [29] 
facilitates the inclusion of business goal policies, and utility functions. The DEN-ng 
PolicyRule class represents an intelligent container that gathers metadata and at least 
one (or more) PolicyEvent, PolicyCondition, and PolicyAction. 
Figure 11 shows the definition of Management Policies used in this approach; note 
that (1) Management Policies may use any type of structural representation of a Pol-
icy Rule, since the ManagementPolicy is an intelligent container that aggregates Poli-
cyRuleStructures; (2) the concepts of PolicySubject (a set of ManagedEntities that 
requests and/or invokes policies in a holistic manner from and/or on a PolicyTarget) 
and PolicyTarget (a set of ManagedEntities that a set of policies will be applied to). 
 
 
Fig. 11. Simplified DEN-ng ManagementPolicy Model 
In DEN-ng, a ManagedEntity is something of interest that can be managed. Any 
ManagedEntity can have contextual information associated with it. We model context 
[40] as an overall concept (the Context class) that may be made up of a set of independ-
ently manageable aspects. The associations relating ManagedEntity to Context and 
ContextData are both optional. ContextDataFacts and ContextDataInferences are intel-
ligent containers that house facts and inferences, respectively, that are computed by 
external applications. Both the Context and ContextData classes use the composite 
pattern for flexibility and extensibility. The ContextAtomic and ContextDataAtomic 
classes represent context that can be modeled as a single, stand-alone object. In contrast, 
the ContextComposite and ContextDataComposite classes represent context objects that 
are made up of multiple distinct Context or ContextData objects that can each be sepa-
rately managed. Hierarchies of context information can be defined and related to other 
context information through the HasContextData aggregation. For example, the Context 
object “Communication” could have the following ContextData objects associated with 
it: PSTN, CellularDevice, PDA, and ComputerDevice, to model the characteristics of 
PolicySubject
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fixed telephone lines, mobile phones, PDAs, and computers, respectively. Each of these 
four classes of device uses different types of media and provides different types of 
communication experiences, and hence different contexts. 
The purpose of the ContextDataDetails association class is to define the particular 
semantics of how ContextData relates to Context. This enables different types of 
ContextData, each modeling a specific aspect of an overall Context, to be aggregated 
together with their own semantics. The ContextSemantics class represents data and/or 
knowledge that describes the behavioral aspects of the Context that this ManagedEn-
tity is associated with. A similar class (ContextDataSemantics) is constructed for the 
ContextData hierarchy. These two classes represent a convenient point for fusing 
information from ontologies with data from information and data models. For exam-
ple, machine-based reasoning can now be used with both of these data. They also 
present convenient points for either augmenting context information (e.g., tagging it 
with metadata to enhance information retrieval) and/or using context data to perform 
(for example) a set of services. Finally, these two semantics classes enable the appli-
cation to declare what it needs to complete its view of context, as opposed to merely 
obtaining context information. 
Figure 12 shows a simplified view of the DEN-ng context-aware policy model. Its 
purpose is to relate context changes to policy changes by selecting the set of Policy 
Rules that are appropriate for this particular context. Those Policy Rules are then 
applied by the autonomic manager to govern system behaviour.  The SelectsPolicies 
aggregation defines a given set of Policies that should be loaded based on the current 
context. Hence, as context changes, policy can change accordingly, enabling our sys-
tem to adapt to changing demands. The PolicyResultAffectsContext association en-
ables policy results to influence Context.  
The selected working set of Policies uses the GovernsManagedEntityRoles aggre-
gation to define the appropriate roles of the ManagedEntities that are influenced by 
this Context; each ManagedEntityRole defines functionality of the ManagedEntity 
that can take on that role.  
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Fig. 12. Simplified DEN-ng Context-Aware Policy Model 
Specifically, Policy is used to define which management information will be  
collected and examined; this management information affects policy decisions, as 
well as selecting which policies should be used at any given time. Once the manage-
ment information is defined, then the two associations MgmtInfoAltersContext and  
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ContextDependsOnMgmtInfo codify these dependencies (e.g., context defines the 
management information to monitor, and the values of these management data affect 
context, respectively). 
4.2   Service Logic Descriptions 
The logic defining logic interactions and technological implications between organi-
zations in a pervasive service is a result of using service management operations in 
form of policies (i.e. Service Code and Policies Distribution, Code Maintenance, 
Service Invocation, Code Execution and Service Assurance). The service manage-
ment policies are referenced in this paper and detailed examples can be found in [5]. 
The service logic description corresponds to the most common management opera-
tions; however, a more extended set of functions that better reflect application re-
quirements can be used instead.  
A more detailed description of these functions can be found in [5]. Implementing 
decisions using these logic descriptions constitute a first task of this approach towards 
creating a tool to support trust management. The use of service management logic 
when DEN-ng is being used as the policy information model includes descriptions 
which do not assume 'static' information for expressing user requirements. In contrast, 
the service management systems can process logic descriptions that can be defined 
dynamically as a result of user interaction. 
Additionally the formal language used for expressing web-services is OWL [41]. 
One of the advantages of using OWL to describe logic concepts is the availability of 
formal tools that use OWL for parsing, reasoning and editing. We use OWL to de-
scribe information that cannot be expressed with graphic notation. We use OWL as 
the formal language that describes the graphic representations and logic sentences as 
part in the policy model supporting trust management.  
5   Trust Model Scenario 
Trust management is able to provide recommendations to governance systems when 
choices have an inherent security risk. Our implementation uses OWL as a formal 
language to represent reputation and trust using first order logic; this enables asser-
tions about reputation and trust to be proven. This approach also uses policy-based 
management as the mechanism to execute and enforce decisions in pervasive service 
operations. Figure 13 shows the scope of test scenarios. These scenarios are focusing 
on controlling pervasive services and Internet services. System management is  
supported by a trust generator subsystem with the objective to decentralize access 
decisions, in this way the management systems delegates security decisions with the 
objective for improving the management operations. 
The most important objectives of our trust- policy-based management system are: 
(1) to decentralize decisions necessary to ensure proper operation, and (2) to support 
the deployment of new services in policy-based management systems that can use 
user information from users who are trustworthy, according to the trust model, to 
generate new services following the preferences and requirements of those users.  
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Fig. 13. Mapping of Trust Model into Web-Services and Internet 
An important type of service that we aim to support with multicriteria support is 
what sociologists have called swift trust [38]. This is a type of trust deployed by a 
social actor in temporary systems such as online communities or temporary working 
teams. In our scenarios, we use this model to support temporary services that, for 
example, only last for a particular session. This reflects the idea that people depend on 
this trust model as the alternative to avoid an indeterminate amount of time while 
measurements are collected that enable the system to compute who can be trusted. 
In addition, communications systems must offer trust management and security in 
the operations performed and governed by management systems. However, this is a 
challenging trade-off between security and performance, due mainly to the use of 
proprietary information and data models to design and guide the implementation of 
securing the information and its associated management processes. Since there is no 
one common information or data modeling standard that can represent vendor-
specific management and security data, securing systems remains a stovepipe design 
process. This is exacerbated by the increasing number of diverse technologies, each 
with their own associated operational and management data. Just as there will never 
be one programming language that all applications will use, there will never be a 
single information model that all vendors and application developers will use.  
This scenario is based on trust management concepts, and uses policy-based prin-
ciples to provide trust management mechanisms based on user reputation. The scope 
of this research is founded in real world social scenarios, where the application of 
trust and reputation models acts as inputs in communication and service management 
systems to detect potential users attempting to create cheating services. 
6   Conclusions 
This paper describes the research challenges for trust management in an environment 
that uses policy-based management to build reputation and trust using social models. 
The main research contribution is our approach to support multi-criteria reputations in 
trust management with policies-based mechanisms that offer a formal alternative for 
representing and implementing guide for trust management. 
This research work proposes to decentralize management decisions by using a 
user-based trust and reputation mechanism. The main application of this model is in 
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the framework of autonomic solutions for future Internet services. However, the scope 
of the model is not limited to this scenario; it can be extended for any system requir-
ing decentralized decisions with multi-criteria processes as generator of trust.  
Social trust and reputation models are applied in communication systems in order 
to provide guidance for trusted users to make decisions having a security risk, as well 
as to help the system detect malicious users and hackers attempting to create cheating 
services or other disruptive services. Future research is being conducted for develop-
ing and comparing different implementations of the model and the statistical results 
are applied on simulations for decentralized management tasks. 
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